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CASE NOTES
Insurance-Liability Insurer's Duty to Settle-[Illinois]. The
defendant insurance company issued a public liability policy to the plaintiff country club, with liability limited to Sio,ooo for bodily injuries
to any one person. An invitee on the plaintiff's premises sustained injuries
on a toboggan slide and brought suit against the plaintiff. Before trial the
insurance company refused an offer by the injured party to settle for
$3,5oo. The claimant recovered a judgment for $2o,ooo. Before appeal she

ofered to settle for $8,ooo, and was again refused. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court.' The defendant paid the claimant $io,8i5.
The plaintiff paid the balance due on the judgment and sued to recover
that amount from the defendant. The trial court instructed the jury that
"when defendant ...

. arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to compro-

mise .... it failed to exercise good faith." The jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, the trial court should have left to the jury the question whether the refusal to settle was in "bad faith." judgment reversed
xHalladay v. Olympia Fields Country Club,

295

Ill. App. 622,

iS

N.E. 2d 345 (i938).
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and remanded for new trial. Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers' Indemnity Insurance Co.2
The insurer by the terms of the usual accident-liability policy has complete control of the defense of any claim arising under its terms, including
the right to settle or compromise any claim against the insured.3 Such
control may be referred to in the contract as an "option to settle, ' 4 an
"exclusive right to contest or settle,"' or "the entire management and defense of the suit"; 6 and the assured is usually forbidden to "interfere in
any negotiation for settlement" 7 or "assume any liability"8 without the
consent of the insurer.
Justification for this exclusive control is said to rest upon the probability that, if the insurer did not retain management of the defense af all
claims, the assured would seek to compromise any claim below the liability limit. 9 The courts have recognized that there is an unavoidable conflict of interest between the insurer and the assured when an offer of settlement by the injured party is for an amount below the maximum coverage of the policy.xo The assured will want to accept any such settlement
2325

Ill.
App. 649, 6o N.E. 2d 896 (1945).

3In the Olympia Fields case the contract provided: "In addition to the Above the Company
Agrees: (2) To Make Such Investigation at its own cost of all accidents reported to the Company to which this Policy applies, and to undertake such negotiations for settlement, or to
make such settlements of any claims for damages made against the Assured, as the Company
may deem expedient; and in the event of suit being brought against the Assured on account of
such an accident, to defend such suit, even if groundless, in the name and on behalf of the
Assured, unless or until the Company shall elect to effect settlement thereof." Ibid., at 651
and 897.
4Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co., 2xo N.Y. 235, 1o4 N.E. 622 (19.14).
5 Lanferman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 222 Wis. 406, 267 N.W. 300 (1936); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929).
6American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F. 2d 446 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1932).
7Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931), affirming 204
Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
8Farmers Gas Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., i86 Miss. 747, I9I So. 415 (i939).
Exclusive control of the defense or settlement of any claim by the insurer applies only to claims
for an amount less than the policy limit. The assured may compromise his own possible liability in excess of the maximum coverage of the policy. Gen'l Accident Fire & Assur. Corp. v.

Louisville Home Telephone Co., 175 Ky. 96, 193 S.W. 1031 (i9'7); see City of Wakefield v.
Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929).

9See Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 293, 170 S.E. 346, 348
(1933); Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 14, 235 N.W. 413, 414 (i93I).
10See Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 143, 10 N.E. 2d 82, 83
170 S.C. 286, 292-93, 170 S.E. 346,
348 (1933); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447,45 I , 46 S.W. 2d 777, 779 (1932); Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 8i N.H. 371, 377, 127 Atl. 708, 711 (1924). But
see Traders & Gen'l Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621, 627 (C.C.A. ioth, 1942),

(1937); Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,

referring to the "common interests" of the parties.
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regardless of the possibility of obtaining a judgment for a lower amount;
he can only lose by contesting. The insurer, on the other hand, may believe the chance of obtaining a judgment for an amount smaller than the
proffered settlement, or even a complete discharge on the merits of the
case, justifies a refusal to compromise. The certainty of this conflict becomes more obvious as the offer tends to proximate the maximum coverage of the policy."
The courts have agreed that the insurer does have certain obligations
to the assured, not explicit in the terms of the policy.- To prevent the insurer from taking advantage of its complete control over the defense or
settlement of the claim courts have sometimes held it liable for the entire
amount of any judgment subsequently entered or affirmed, even though
the amount exceeded the maximum coverage of the policy. The courts
have struggled to establish a standard by which the decision of the insurer
to refuse a settlement below the policy might be measured. In some cases
the liability of the insurer to the assured has been predicated upon the
"negligence" of the insurer in failing to accept a proffered settlement. 3
The test of negligence as used to assess the failure of the insurer to make
a careful investigation4 or accept the advice of its investigators S is inadequate to resolve the conflict of interest between insurer and assured when
a settlement offer is below the face of the policy. The decision of the insurer to litigate rather than settle will inevitably increase the risk to the
6
assured regardless of the "reasonableness" of the insurer's decision.
11In the principal case the refusal of the insurer to accept the $3,5oo settlement offer meant
that it was risking the loss of an additional $6,5o0 against a maximum possible gain of $3,500.
When the offer was $8,ooo a refusal to settle meant that the insurer stood to lose only $2,oOo by
contesting, while, if the appellate court reversed the award of $20,000, it would gain $8,000.

The risk to the assured was greater at the time of the $8,ooo offer, since the lower court had already entered judgment for $20,000.
12

See cases cited in notes 13 and 17, infra.

3Douglas v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924); Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co., 86 F. 2d 449 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Wyoming Valley Paper Co., 84 F. 2d 633 (C.C.A. ist, 1936). A few courts have held that
a showing of negligence is not sufficient to hold the insurer liable for failure to accept a settle-

ment below the maximum coverage of the policy. Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability Ins.
Co., 298 Mass. 141,
X4

1o

N.E. 2d 82 (1937).

Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co., 86 F. 2d 449, 452 (C.C.A. 7 th, 1936).

ISCity of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929).
x6 The courts that apply the "negligence" test say it is the duty of the insurer to settle the
claim if it is the "reasonable thing to do." Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
170 S.C. 286, 294, 170 S.E. 346, 349 (1933); Cavannaugh Bros. v. Gen'l Accident, Fire & Life
Assur. Corp., 79 N.H. i86, xo4 Atl. 604 (1919). It is difficult to tell what this means. The risk

of litigation may be "reasonable" from the point of view of the insurer though "unreasonable"
as far as the assured's interests are concerned. Note ii, supra.
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More frequently it is said that the test is whether the insurer acted in
"good faith" toward the assured in deciding to contest, rather than settle, the claim. 7 The standard of good faith has not been satisfactory. As
observed in the principal case' the decisions are in "hopeless disagreement" as to when the refusal of the insurer to accept settlement will constitute "bad faith."' 9 The test of good faith seems to imply a duty on the
part of the insurer to consider the interests of the assured.20 One explanation for the confusion may be the failure of the courts to recognize that,
if good faith means "due regard for" the assured's interests,2 the refusal

of the insurer to accept any offer below the policy limit is, in itself, an act
of bad faith toward the assured.
The standard of good faith has apparently developed out of the belief
that the relationship between the insurer and the assured is that of agent
and principal.22 In the attempt to stake out the limits of an insurer's liability for a failure to settle, the courts have borrowed from the law of agency a yardstick that was not designed to measure the rights and duties of
the parties to an insurance contract. The agent-principal relationship does
not inexorably involve a conflict of interest between the agent and his
principal. A conflict may arise between them, but, unlike the limited-liaX7Traders & Gen'l Ins. Co. v. Rudco Gas & Oil Co., 129 F. 2d 62i (C.C.A. ioth, 1942);
Berl v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 245 Wis. 597, iS N.W. 2d 834 (1944); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Cook O'Brien Construction Co., 69 F. 2d 462 (C.C.A. 8th, i934), cert. den.
293 U.S. 569 (i934); Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
is Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 66o, 6o
N.E. 2d 896, 9oi (i945).
x9...... the disagreement results from a difference of opinion as to the nature and kind of
proof that the insured must introduce to make out a prima facie case of bad faith against the
insurer," ibid.; see Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 494, i A. 2d 817,
822 (1938); City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 651, 225 N.W. 643, 645
(1929).

0Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 291, 170 S.E. 346, 348
(1933) (the insurer must "sacrifice its interests in favor of those of the insured"); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W. 2d 777, 779 (1932) (the insurer "may look to its
own interests as well as those of the insured"); American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper,
61 F. 2d 446, 447 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1932). But see Bilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis.
12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931), where the court said the insurer need look only to its own interests.
The court, however, held that the failure to settle was in bad faith, implying that the insurer
should have considered the interests of the assured; see Abrams v. Factory Mutual Liability
Ins. Co., 298 Mass 141, 145, 10 N.E. 2d 82, 83 (1937).
2"Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 491, i A. 2d 817, 820 (1938).
- Bilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 7, 231 N.W. 257, 259 (1931), overruling on this point Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co., 162 Wis. 39, 52, i55 N.W. io8i, xo86
(19x6); see Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 8i N.H. 371, 376, 127 Atl. 708,
711 (i924 ); Traders & Gen'l Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F. 2d 621, 627 (C.C.A. ioth,
1942); Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co., 86 F. 2d 449, 453 (C.C.A. 7th, 1936)', but
see Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W. 2d 777, 779 (1932).
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bility contract, the agreement between the parties does not by its very
terms forecast a conflict of interest. The adverse interest of the agent who
buys in the market at the same time that he buys for his principal,23 or who
acts as agent for a seller as well as agent for a buyer 2 4 does not inhere in
the contract relation between the parties. The standard of good faith as
employed to judge the acts of an agent should not be carried over into
the field of insurance law.2The confusion is not relieved by passing on to the jury, as in the principal case, the task of deciding whether the failure to settle was in "bad
faith."2
One way out of the present uncertainty would be to require the insurer
to pay the full amount of any judgment rendered subsequent to a refusal
to accept an offer of settlement below the maximum coverage of the policy. The point is not that the insurer must accept every offer of settlement
which is below the policy limit. Rather, it would appear reasonable that, if
the insurer insists upon complete control of the defense or settlement of
any claim, it should be willing to assume the risks as well as claim the
benefits resulting from its decision to litigate rather than settle. Under the
current rules the insurer, at the best, cannot avoid being influenced by the
knowledge that, if it makes a bad guess as to the outcome of the litigation,
it need not bear all the consequent financial burden. At the worst, the insurer will deliberately gamble with the assured's money, forcing the assured to prove, in a separate action, that the failure to settle was m bad
faith. The nearer the offer is to the policy limit, the less the insurer has to
lose by contesting the claim, though court costs and lawyers' fees may be,
in any case, some deterrent to rash action by the insurer.
The result of such a departure from the present confusion is not so
shocking as might at first appear. In at least one case, the terms of the liability policy provided that if the insurer refused an offer of settlement below the maximum coverage of the policy the coverage of the policy would
be doubled.2 7 The fact that in this case the assured was a railroad corpora23Rest., Agency § 393, Comment (b) (1933).
24 Ibid., § 392.
2s But see Hilker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co.,

204 Wis. i, 6, 231

N.W.

257, 259 (1930).

But see Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 374,

127 At.
708, 710 (1924).
'7 "It is further agreed and understood that when the company has the opportunity to settle the claim of any injured employee within the limit designated in this policy, viz., five
thousand dollars ($5,ooo), and fails to take advantage of such opportunity for settlement within the time provided in the preceding paragraph, the company shall thereafter -protect the assured from any judgment not in excess of ten thousand dollars ..... " Georgia Life Ins. Co. v.
Mississippi Cent. R. Co., I16 Miss. 114, 116, 76 So. 646, 647 (1917).
26
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tion suggests -that the more common provisions giving the insurer complete control without additional financial responsibility for an error in
judgment simply reflect the inferior bargaining position of most policy
holders.21 Courts do take notice of the superior bargaining position of
most insurers.29 If higher premiums were the result of imposing full responsibility upon the insurer, where settlement offers below the policy
limit are refused, such a consequence would not be contrary to a public
°
policy favoring greater distribution of riskY
The practical consequences of such a step probably would be the redrafting of insurance contracts expressly to exempt insurers from such unlimited liability. This effect might be sufficient justification for a harsher
rule, if it called attention to the consequences of placing complete control
in the hands of the insurer. In any case, the contract should provide expressly for the rights and duties of the parties in the event that the insurer refuses to accept a settlement offer below the face of the policy. s'
Who shall bear the risk of the decision to contest rather than settle a claim
should not be determined by reference to vague notions of "good faith"
32
or "reasonableness." Judicial reluctance to discard the good faith test,
however inappropriate, suggests that any radical departure from current
rules will have to be taken by the legislature.33
If courts continue to demand, as the Illinois court did in the principal
case, that juries try to determine whether or not a refusal to settle was in
28 "In this case the insurance company no longer holds the assured 'in the hollow of its
hands,' " ibid., dissent, at 135 and 653; see Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
170 S.C. 286, 293, 170 S.E. 346 (1933), referring to the insurer's exclusive power to settle or
contest as a "heads I win; tails you lose" proposition.
29 Ehrenzweig and Kessler, Misrepresentation and False Warranty in the Illinois Insurance

Code, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.

209 (1942).

. 584, 720 (1929);
Loss Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 729 (I94I).
3o Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L.

31See Best Building Co. v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 456, 16o N.E.
911, 913 (1928). If most assureds are not in a strong enough bargaining position to demand

double indemnity in the event that the insurer refuses a settlement offer, the contract might
provide that if the insurer decides to contest rather than settle a claim, it will pay half of the
amount by which any subsequent judgment is above the liability limit.
32 In some of the early cases assureds asserted that the refusal to settle, ipso facto, placed
the burden of any subsequent judgment upon the insurer. The courts said that such unlimited
liability could not be read into a limited liability contract. Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 Atl. 503 (1889); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Cotton Mills Product Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (i931).
33 For a discussion of legislation designed to readjust the rights and duties of the parties
under other provisions in insurance contracts see Ehrenzweig and Kessler, op. cit. supra, note
28; Statutes Affecting Representation in Insurance Contracts, 32 Col. L. Rev. 522 (1932).
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III

bad faith, the attention of the jury should be drawn to the fact that a refusal to settle by the insurer was not accompanied by an assumption of all
the risks of such a decision even though the insurer had complete control
over the management of the defense or settlement of the claim. Furthermore, it should be proper for a trial court to point out to the jury that the
proximity of the settlement offer to the maximum coverage of the policy
might influence the insurer's decision to contest, rather than to settle, a
s4
claim.
HERBER.T N. WooDwARD*

Conflict of Laws-Torts-Rules in Phillips v. Eyre-[Canada].-The plaintiff and the defendant were residents of Quebec. The plaintiff, in Quebec, accepted the defendant's invitation to make a trip to Ottawa as a gratuitous passenger in the defendant's automobile. In an accident, which happened in Ontario when the defendant, in rainy weather, was driving down a hill at great
speed, the plaintiff was injured. An action for damages was brought in Quebec.
An Ontario statute expressly exempts the driver of an automobile from liability
to a passenger;' under another statutory provision of Ontario a person "who
drives a motor vehicle on the highway without due care and attention" is guilty
of an offense, and is punishable by fine or imprisonment.2 Under Quebec law the
negligent driver of an automobile is liable to a gratuitous passenger.3 The Supreme Court of Quebec affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada. McLean v. Pettigrew.4
The case illustrates the difference between the British and the American approach to tort cases involving problems of conflict of laws. An American court,
applying the rule that problems of the law of torts are to be decided under the
law of the place where the alleged wrong took place, s would almost certainly
have applied to the case the law of Ontario, where the accident occurred. English courts have not found it necessary to decide tort cases brought before them
under any foreign law. Rules of jurisdiction may preclude an action from being
brought in England at all, for instance, when the defendant neither resides in
England nor can be personally served there. If, however, the action can be
brought in England, the court will decide it under its own law. If, under an
34 Note iz, supra.
* Member of the Illinois Bar.

x Highway Traffic Act, § 47(2).
'Highway Traffic Act, § 27.
3 In an extensive discussion of decisions of Quebec courts, French cases, and French textwriters, this liability was held to be based upon tort (quasi-d61it) rather than upon a contract of
gratuitous transportation (contract de bienfaisance); per Taschereau, J. [i945] 2 D.L.R. 65,
at 66-76.
4[945] 2 D.L.R. 65.
s See Restatement of Torts, §§ 379 et seq.

